https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/2024-08-072024-08-0731-03-2019https://beta-pyxida.aueb.gr/handle/123456789/6959Acquirers pursue M&A in order to gain access to resources and capabilities of other firms. Such a resource is innovation and acquisition of a highly innovative target would increase their competitive advantage. Thus, acquirers might be willing to offer a premium high above the prevailing market price for targets more innovative than them. This dissertation examines the impact of acquirers’ and targets’ innovation efforts differences on the premium paid, measured by R&D intensity. Furthermore, it takes into consideration the role of targets managerial composition. It examines target CEOs age and target CEOs tenure moderating effect on the relationship between premium and innovation differences. Also, the model controls for acquirer CEOs and both firms-specific characteristics. The empirical analysis results, based on a six-year sample of S&P500 firms engaged in M&A activity, show that differences in firm characteristics impact premiums more than CEO characteristics.Mergers and acquisitionsInnovationManagementCEOPremium paidΣυγχωνεύσειςΕξαγορέςΤιμή εξαγοράςΤιμή συγχώνευσηςΚαινοτομίαΔιευθύνων σύμβουλοςText